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Abstract— We propose the concept ofOverlay-linked IntServ
(OLIntServ), a system architecture that combines network over-
lays with intra-domain QoS to provide assured communications
over the Internet, while allowing ISPs to extend the reach of
their currently under-utilized IntServ services. We describe our
system prototype, and provide some preliminary experimental
results on its efficacy.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The increasing reliance on the Internet for time- and
mission-critical communications has brought to the forefront
concerns about its availability and reliability. Whether due to
natural traffic fluctuations or large-scale distributed denial of
service attacks, the available bandwidth for relatively long-
lived, time-sensitive communication streams can vary dramati-
cally over the lifetime of such flows. To address such concerns,
end-to-end network QoS reservation protocols were designed.
However, years of research on various QoS architectures
for the Internet have resulted in sophisticated proposals that
have not been broadly accepted commercially. In particular,
Integrated Services (IntServ) and Differentiated Services (Diff-
Serv) have long been supported by major router and operating
system vendors, yet have only seen minimal use in practice.
Without postulating as to the possible reasons behind the lack
of enthusiasm on behalf of ISPs and users, we recognize the
fact that an enterprise that wishes to have some QoS assurances
today (and, we suspect, in the near future) has few options.
Network overlays has been shown to offer some statistical
guarantees that the underlying network fabric does not. Forex-
ample, overlays can improve the performance and robustness
of unicast routing [1], [2] by providing alternate paths from
a particular source to a particular destination along pathsthat
proceeded through intermediate end-systems. However, such
approaches require considerable application customization nd
coordination among the (distributed) overlay nodes.
We proposeBandExSOS, a hybrid architecture that com-
bines intra-ISP QoS reservations (based on RSVP) with a
multi-path-routing overlay architecture based on our previous
work on Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [3]. In our proposed
approach, either (or both) communication end-points build
secure RSVP tunnels [4] to the closest overlay node, which
should reside in the same ISP (or is otherwise “reachable” by
RSVP). End-to-end traffic is then routed through these overlay
nodes. Inside the overlay, traffic is replicated and routed
through several disjoint paths, seeking to improve resilience
and to take advantage of traffic asymmetries.
Our experiments using Planetlab indicate that in many cases,
our approach can result in a dependable decrease in end-
to-end latency, and (perhaps most importantly) decrease the
latency variance. Although preliminary, we believe our results
demonstrate that our approach is a promising way of bridging
the QoS reservation gap across the Internet.
II. RELATED WORK
QoS provision and management has a wide-ranging lit-
erature. A lot of the early work was stimulated by the
promise of ATM networks. The demand for these services
was stimulated by multimedia traffic. The relevant promise
was the control of multiplexing behavior in both end-points
and network elements, with the idea that queuing disciplines
such as Fair Queuing or its many variants could be used to
allocate bandwidth resources and provide delay bounds.
Despite the ever-increasing use of time-sensitive protocols
(e.g., VoIP, audio on demand,etc.) bandwidth reservation has
not been particularly successful. This is caused mainly by
the fear that since these applications have modest bandwidth
requirements the operation of a reservation and payment
infrastructure would not be feasible economically. Recently,
however, newer applications such as video on demand, tele-
presence, and Grid Computing, have bandwidth requirements
that may constitute a significant portion of the available
bandwidth. The overheads associated with reservation and
billing are smaller (because we are dealing with fewer, more
expensive reservations), while the benefits are greater becaus
of the impact of the data flows on the infrastructure.
In Grid Computing in particular, efforts are already un-
derway [5], to allow end-users to create end-to-end light
paths (optical links that allow unstructured access to the fib r
infrastructure) by combining individual segments very much
as we described in the introduction. The current systems, how-
ever, are targeted towards the academic community and hence
assume that end-users have the required expertise and have
non-competitive usage strategies. Specifically under the “User
Controlled Light Paths” framework [5],(a) end-users have to
e known by the system in advance,(b) policy enforcement is
not addressed,(c) there is no purchasing of bandwidth, since
the network is considered a common resource. In a commercial
environment, a similar system must deal with billing (i.e., how
the reserved bandwidth can be paid by the user) and must
support bandwidth reservation in a scalable and secure manner.
Each reservation carries with it some overhead. This in-
cludes both protocol overhead, but also state that must be
maintained by routers for each reservation. As the number
of reservations increases so does the overhead. Unless there
is some kind of aggregation of requests this overhead will
ultimately define an upper bound on the number of reserva-
tions that can be accommodated by the existing infrastructue.
The complexity of some of the proposed systems [6], [7] and
the small scale of their test-beds casts grave doubts on their
ability to scale to millions of users and thousands of network
elements. Various techniques that attempt to improve scalabil-
ity through aggregation are vulnerable to abuse. For example,
Zhanget al. [8] describe request aggregation whereby multiple
requests are merged into a single larger request for the total
bandwidth asked for by the individual requests. This approach,
however, may result in an upstream node declining the single
request thus denying access to all the requests, even through
some of the individual requests could have gone through [9].
III. A RCHITECTURE
Our architecture, shown in Figure 1 combines two different
components: a distributed overlay network that is used for
multi-path routing of traffic between any pair of overlay nodes,
and a secure RSVP-based reservations system (BandEx) for
building a tunnel from either communication end-point to the
closest overlay node. In essence, the overlay provides the
missing link between the IntServ reservations of the end-
points. By exploiting redundant available capacity and by
spreading the risk of unexpected traffic peaks across many
links, our architecture should minimize the impact of such
traffic peaks (or denial of service attacks) on any given link.
Section IV contains some preliminary experimental evidence
supporting our hypothesis. We should note that our results are
consistent with independent work on the effect of multi-path
routing on end-to-end latency [10] and availability [11].
In the remainder of this section we provide an overview of
these two components. We refer the reader to our previous
work describing these systems in more detail [12], [4].
A. SpreadSpectrum SOS
Our network overlay architecture extends the ideas of SOS
[3]. SOS effectively implements functionality equivalentto
that of a firewall “deep” enough in the network such that
the access link to an end-host does not become congested
as a result of a denial of service attack. In terms of network
topology, this typically means the first or second-level router
in the hosting Internet Service Provider’s Point-of-Presence
(POP). This distributed firewall may perform access control
by using protocols such as IPsec or TLS, or by relying on au-
thentication and authorization services from the system being
protected. Traffic is then routed to a secret location, which
can be the service provider itself or a node that is allowed
to contact the service provider (called “secret forwarder”in
SOS [3]), with all other traffic being filtered, as shown in
Figure 2. The secret forwarder can vary over time, and is
different for each site protected by the overlay; part of the
functionality built in these indirection mechanisms concer s
itself with maintaining and propagating this information to
other indirection nodes. Otherwise, we assume that the identity
of the protected server and all indirection nodes is publicly
known or easily determined by an attacker.
Fig. 2. The Secure Overlay Services anti-DDoS system
Our approach with multi-path SOS is straightforward: instead
of picking one (possibly random) path through the overlay,
spread the packets from the overlay ingress node (or from
the end host, if no network reservations are possible) across
all indirection nodes in a pseudo-random manner. This new
communication mechanism also protects the client-server con-
nection establishment and guarantees uninterrupted connetiv-
ity to the target server throughout the client’s session. The
admitted packets are internally forwarded to the overlay egress
point (the node to which the remote peer has created an RSVP
tunnel to), or to a random overlay node that is authorized
to forward traffic to the remote end host. Only authorized
clients are allowed to use the overlay and contact the hosting
servers and these clients are provisioned in advance (e.g., at
registration time) with the appropriate authentication materi l,
such as an RSA public/private key pair and a public-key
certificate. BandExSOS may work in conjunction with filtering
routers close to the hosting infrastructure, to allow only traffic
from the overlay’s egress points (identified through the RSVP
tunnel) to reach end hosts. All other traffic is filtered out or
at a minimum rate-limited.
B. BandEx
Having provided an effective mechanism for protecting the
data traffic as it transits the network core, we are left with
the problem of providing an equivalent level of protection fr
the “last-hop”. In other words, we need a mechanism that will
safeguard data streams between the connection end-points and
the BandExSOS core.
We propose a mechanism for secure bandwidth reservation
by allowing a content provider to pay for a customer’s band-
width. Under our scheme, the content provider (Figure 4) pays
for the bandwidth to the customer, by sending the customer
Fig. 1. The BandExSOS architecture
an electronic check for the reservation. The customer then
initiates a secure-RSVP operation issuing checks guaranteed
by the provider’s check to the ISP’s nodes. Eventually the
path reaches the overlay cloud. The overlay is considered by
RSVP as one hop, so the path eventually exits the overlay and
resource reservation is resumed until the content provider’s
network is reached, completing the transaction.
This architecture assumes that the ISP (or ISPs) have a
business relationship with the content provider. If this isnot
the case, then a credit institution such as a bank can act as the
link between the two parties. In this case, the credit institution
will issue a “spending authorization” credential to the content
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Fig. 3. Trust relationship for secure reservations. Other trust
relationships are possible, and are orthogonal to the overlay.
Consider the case of Alice who wishes to watch a movie
provided by a Content Provider (CP). When Alice selects her
movie, she will be provided with the appropriate bandwidth
purchasing credentials and anRSVPtransaction will be initiated
to create a path between Alice’s machine and theCP’s network.
RSVP messages are composed of objects that specify im-
portant parameters for the reservation exchange. Two of these
objects, RSVP’s FLOWSPEC and POLICY DATA , are relevant
to our discussion. AFLOWSPECcontains the requested QoS
parameters and thePOLICY DATA object contains information
r garding authorization policies for the request. These obj cts
are both checked before a reservation is made to ensure that
the request is possible.RSVPuses theFLOWSPECin admission
control to check whether router actually supports and has
adequate resources for the desired QoS. Additionally, policy
control checks whether the reservation is authorized usingthe
information contained within thePOLICY DATA object and
most likely, a local policy. Both objects were designed to be
completely opaque to theRSVP specification. That is,RSVP
was not designed for a specific QoS or policy model in mind
so that it could be extended easily for future QoS and policy
control services.RFC 2210 specifies an implementation ofIETF
Integrated Services withRSVP which is probably the most
common form of theFLOWSPEC in current implementations.
Our implementation uses thePOLICY DATA object to convey
policy information for the BandExSOS architecture.RFC 2750
describes thePOLICY DATA object as being composed of
any number of policy elements. The information within these
elements is application defined and is not dictated byRSVP.
Assuming that network element 12 (NE-12) belonging to
ISP is in the reservation path, theRSVP message will include
the credentials shown in Figure 3. NE-12 will receive the
request and will be able to determinesolely on the basis
of the information provided in the message whether to grant
or deny the reservation request. Thus, each network element
can reserve resources on its own without communicating
with other computers of the ISP’s network. This reduces the
overhead of the transaction and speeds the decision.
KeyNote Microchecks BandExSOS uses KeyNote [13] cre-
dentials for bandwidth reservation. These credentials describe
the conditions under which a user is allowed to perform a
transaction and the fact that a Content Provider is authorized
to participate in a particular transaction.
Initially, the CP encodes the details of the desired bandwidth








Fig. 4. Microbilling architecture diagram.
with additional credentials that authorize theCP to utilize the
bandwidth under the same conditions as those enclosed in the
credit authorization. The customer includes these credentials
in the RSVP messages along with a microcheck for the desired
bandwidth. The credit authorizations and microchecks are
encoded as KeyNote credentials that authorize payment for
a specific transaction. The user creates a KeyNote credential
signed with her public key and sends it, along with her
credential from theCP, to the first network element of the
ISP. This credential is effectively a check signed by the user
(the Authorizer) and payable to theISP (the Licensee). The
conditions under which this check is valid match the credit
authorization sent to the user by theCP. Part of the credit
authorization is a nonce, which maps payments to specific
transactions, and prevents double-depositing by theISP.
To determine whether he can expect to be paid (and there-
fore whether to accept the payment), theISP passes the action
description (the attributes and values in the offer) and the
user’s key along with theISP’s policy (that identifies theCP’s
key), the user credential, the credit authorization credential
(signed by theCP), and the microchecks credential (signed
by the user) to his local KeyNote compliance checker. If
the compliance checker authorizes the transaction, theISP
is guaranteed that theCP will allow payment. The correct
linkage among theISP’s policy, the CP key, the user key,
and the transaction details follow from KeyNote’s semantics
[13]. If the transaction is approved, theISP can configure
the appropriate routers such that the user’s traffic is treated
according to the offer, and store a copy of the microcheck
along with the user credential and associated offer detailsfor
later settlement and payment.
Periodically, theISP will ‘deposit’ the microchecks (and
associated transaction details) he has collected to the Clearing
and Settlement Center (CSC). The CSC may or may not be
run by the same company as theCP, but it must have the
proper authorization to transmit billing and payment records
to theCP for the customers. TheCSC receives payment records
from the variousISPs; these records consist of the offer, and
the KeyNote microcheck and credential from the user sent in
response to the offer. To verify that a microcheck is good, the
CSC goes through a similar procedure as theISP did when
accepting the microcheck. If the KeyNote compliance checker
approves, the check is accepted. Using her public key as an
index, the user’s account is debited for the transaction amount.
Similarly, the ISP’s account is credited for the same amount.
BandExSOS Operation Having seen the overall system
architecture, let us look at a particular example.Alice is a
user who wants to watch a movie fromMartha’s site. Alice
will need to reserve bandwidth for that particular link with
Nick’s ISP. Alice contacts Martha and obtains a freshcredit
authorization credential, which allows her to issue KeyNote
microchecks. The CA credential shown below (most of the hex
digits from the keys have been removed for brevity) allows
Alice to write checks for up to 0.55 US Dollars, and she can
do so until March 24th, 2007.
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ALICE KEY = "rsa-base64:MCgCIQ...
MARTHA KEY = "rsa-base64:MIGJAo..."
Authorizer: MARTHA KEY
Licensees: ALICE KEY
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" &&
currency == "USD" && &amount < 0.56
&& date < "20070324" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:QU6SZ..."
Alice contacts herISP and receives an offer credential that
contains the cost and parameters of the reservation. For




ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
ROUTE KEY = "rsa-base64:33a41..."
Authorizer: ISP KEY
Licensees: ROUTE KEY
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" &&
currency == "USD" &&
&bandwidth <= "50Mbps" &&
link name == "Dublin-NYC" &&
&amount >= 0.44
&& date < "20071120 -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:ab1XXA..."
In practice an Offer Credential includes QoS attributes, such
as bandwidth, using the IntservFLOWSPEC notation defined
in RFC 2210. With the offer credential on hand, Alice then
writes a check for the appropriate amount:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ALICE KEY = "rsa-base64:Mcg..."
ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
Authorizer: ALICE KEY
Licensees: ISP KEY
Conditions: app domain == "BAND-X" &&
currency == "USD" && amount == "0.44"
&& nonce == "eb2c3dfc8e9a" &&
date == "20071120" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:Qsd..."
The nonce is a random number that must be different
for each check, guaranteeing that there will be no double-
depositing of checks. Alice then sends the Offer Credentialand
the micro-check to Nick’s router usingRSVP. Nick receives
these credentials, validates the microcheck to make sure that
he will get paid, and configures the router appropriately. If
the check is not good, Nick will say so, and refuse to make
the reservation. Nick will verify that he will get paid, and
will evaluate the Offer Credential and the microcheck usinga
simple policy such as:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
NICK KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
MARTHA KEY = "rsa-base64:MIGJAo..."
Authorizer: POLICY
Licensees: MARTHA KEY && NICK KEY
Conditions:
app domain == "BAND-X" -> "true";
This policy says that anything that Nick’s keyand the
Martha’s key jointly authorize is allowed. Thus, Alice must
submit a valid payment and a valid Offer Credential. Since
the bandwidth was paid for, and a path can be found from
POLICY to a user (Alice) that has delegated to Nick’s key,
which in turn has created an open-access Offer Credential,
the operation is allowed.
If additional routers need to be configured in Nick’sISP,
the first router forwards the necessary information to the next.
Note that it is not necessary for the router itself to perform
the signature verifications and policy validations: it can simply
refer these operations to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), as is
envisioned by the IntServ architecture.
Discussion The mechanism described above allows band-
width reservation to be set up for the “last hop” in a way
that is both efficient and manageable. We now address the two
major problems that made bandwidth reservation a non-starter
in the past, namely scalability and trust.
Scalability issues emerge as multiple reserved paths con-
verge in the backbone and core portions of the network,
burdening routers with large numbers of reservation entries.
In our case the scalability problem is not a concern as we are
only interested in the last-hop, the protection of data streams
in the core is handled by another mechanism. Thus, we use
reservations only in the portion of the path that they are useful
and dispense with them in the part where they cause problems.
The problem oftrust is more complex, as allowing a cus-
tomer to issue a reservation request (e.g., using a reservation
protocol such as RSVP), implies that we need some way to
determine whether wetrust the requests issued by the customer
to our network elements. The problem is made worse by the
fact that connections may span provider boundaries, thus the
network elements of a remote provider may receive requests
from a customer that has no previous relationship with the
provider. Our system addresses this by limiting both the num-
ber of network elements that need to receive reservations and
the domains that need to be crossed before reaching the core
overlay network, and by allowing a (relatively) small number
of entities (the content providers) to have trusted relationships
with the ISP. For connections spanning national boundaries,
our framework also supports the use of credit institutions (e.g.,
banks) that can form a top level trust layer, linking ISP to
content providers in remote jurisdictions. Note that the trust
structure is independent of the overlay mechanism.
IV. EVALUATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our architecture, we imple-
mented the BandExSOS prototype and deployed the indirec-
tion nodes in 80 PlanetLab nodes, while having the client and
server reside in our local network. Our architecture spreads the
packets across all indirection nodes, without performing ay
measurements or using any type of feedback from the network.
Although such analysis has been shown to be beneficial [10],
our results are encouraging even in the naive case.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our implementation is
its size: excluding cryptographic libraries, the system consists
of less than 4,000 lines of well commentedC code. Although
this is a prototype implementation and does not include
management code and other facilities that would be required
in a production system, we feel that the system is surprisingly
lightweight and easy to comprehend.
Fig. 5. End-to-end average latency results for the index page
and a collection of pages for www.cnn.com. The different points
denote the change in the end-to-end latency through the overlay
(To) when compared to the direct connection (Td). Different
lines represent different overlays sizes. Increasing the replication
factor and overlay size, we get lower average latency results
because of the multi-path effect on the transmitted packets.
Looking at the end-to-end average latency results in Fig-
ure 5, we note that as we increase the replication factor (i.e.,
the number of packet copies that are routed through different
paths in the overlay), and for larger overlay networks, we get
better average latency results. The worst-case scenario involves
a 2.5 increase in latency, dropping to1.5 with 50% packet
replication (i.e., probability of replicating a packet of50%).
To measure the effectiveness of our system in the presence
of highly variable traffic, we simulated network unreachability
by disabling overlay nodes at random. In our experiment, the
overlay ingress point kept spreading data across all overlay
nodes, since it was unaware which of the overlay nodes were
temporarily unreachable (no feedback). We then varied the

























Fig. 6. Impact of failures of the overlay network on end-to-
end latency. Different curves represent varying levels of packet
replication. With 200% packet replication, latency increases by
less than25% when up to 50% of paths fail.
resulting increase in latency. The results are shown in Figure 6.
When we do not use any replication, TCP connections perform
relatively well when the losses are up to9%-10% of the
total packets transmitted. As we increase the packet replication
factor, we achieve higher network resilience.
The dominant cost of the reservation component is that
of authentication and authorization,i.e., in the evaluation of
the credentials to determine whether the request is consiste t
with the policy. While in the example shown earlier we show
requests involving three parties, this is not always the cas. For
example, one or more credit institutions may be used to link
the content provider with variousISPs. For this reason, network
elements may receive requests containing chains of two or
more credentials and hence expend more computational power
in order to evaluate them. Table I shows how the addition
of credentials affects the overall processing of requests (the
numbers originated from tests run on a Dell PowerEdge 1550
and represent average times, in microseconds, over 100 trials).
We show the time taken to process requests which include 3 to
7 credentials with the policy engine active (column 2) and with
the policy engine replaced with a routine that always returns
true (column 3). The difference between the two measurements
(column 4) shows the cost of credential evaluation which is
significant. The request processing time increases even if the
policy engine is disabled, because the system must still parse
and process the larger requests.
Packet Size Average Time Average Time Average
With BandEx Without BandEx Time Difference
2612 2793.14 248.96 2544.18
3548 3479.87 261.3 3218.57
5116 4753.54 304.14 4449.4
6356 5518.06 321.46 5196.6
7620 6721.52 337.72 6383.8
TABLE I
Request processing costvs. number of credentials used (µ-secs)
Even though these operations are relatively expensive, the
impact of the overhead is minimal since(a) such operations
occur only when the bandwidth is initially allocated,(b) the
cost is distributed among the network elements, so that if a
new reservation request affectsn network elements, the total
time for the operation is that of the slowest element, and(c)
the number of credentials in a chain depends on the parties
involved (i.e., the number of middlemen in the transaction),
so it is unlikely to be higher than 4 to 5.
To avoid computational denial of service attacks, wherein
attackers send bogus reservation requests to overlay nodesan
routers,ISPs must allow only their users to use BandEx (i.e.,
filter RSVP requests coming from outside theISP perimeter).
Misbehaving local users can be detected and quarantined
through credential revocation or other mechanisms.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed the concept ofOverlay-linked IntServ
(OLIntServ), a system architecture that combines network
overlays with intra-domain QoS to provide assured commu-
nications over the Internet, while allowing ISPs to extend
the reach of their currently under-utilized IntServ services.
We describe our prototype system architecture that uses our
SpreadSpectrum SOS overlay network [12] and the BandEx
secure network reservations system [4]. By combining the two
systems, it is possible to provide a secure, highly available,
disruption-tolerant end-to-end path without requiring end-to-
end (across multiple ISPs) availability of QoS reservation
primitives such as DiffServ. Our preliminary experimental
results show that this approach promises to help bridge the
gap between inter- and intra-ISP network reservations. Our
plans for future work include building and deploying a full
system prototype, conducting further experiments using real-
time traffic and delay-sensitive applications, and examining the
impact of smart attacks against the system.
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